He widened his attack to suggest that the BBC was opposed to the war in general.What was the BBC reaction to those complaints?Richard Sambrook, director of news at the BBC, Gavyn Davies, the chairman and Greg Dyke, the director general, stuck to their guns. Mr Campbell complained, but for some reason did not use the BBC Complaints Unit and wrote letters instead. Brian Jones and his chemical weapons chief felt the claim was not “reliable” because it was single-sourced, second-hand and failed to make clear it referred to battlefield munitions, not long-range missiles.What was the response and complaints made by the Government to the BBC relating to the broadcast?No 10 made clear while the programme was on air that it felt the central charge about it “transforming” the dossier was false. The hardening up of the passage on the 45-minutes threat was included “against the wishes” of members of the DIS. It is clear that the 45-minute claim was not included in the dossier at Mr Campbell’s “behest”.But Mr Campbell’s suggestions for stronger language in the dossier were accepted by John Scarlett, chairman of the JIC. It has been claimed that Dr Kelly didn’t use the word “transformed”.Were the matters reported by Mr Gilligan during his radio broadcast and in his Mail on Sunday article true? Mr Dingemans said it was for this reason that the inquiry would hear further evidence about the September dossier.Mr Gilligan accepts that he was wrong to state in an early broadcast that No 10 wanted intelligence in the dossier “knowing” it was untrue.

A tape from Susan Watts, another BBC reporter, shows that Dr Kelly believed No 10 was involved.Did Mr Gilligan accurately report what was said by Dr Kelly in his broadcast on 29 May and in his Mail on Sunday article on 1 June?Mr Gilligan is in trouble over evidence that it was he who used the name Campbell first. Dr Kelly admitted to MPs that he may have used the word “sexier”. Much of the intelligence does now look to have been incorrect or misleading.What was said by Dr Kelly to the BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan on 22 May?Dr Kelly said that he didn’t recognise himself as the main source for Mr Gilligan’s broadcast. Mr Campbell will argue that he was making presentational points and correcting inconsistencies. It is unclear whether he saw theSeptember JIC assessment on the 45-minute claim.Were the Prime Minister and Mr Campbell and other officials in No 10 responsible for intelligence being set out in the dossier which was incorrect or misleading, or to which improper emphasis was given?The Intelligence and Security Committee has already made clear that the dossier failed to include caveats for its claims about 45 minutes and production of chemical and biological agents. It appears that he had not seen earlier drafts but was undoubtedly told about them. Changes in wording from Alastair Campbell were also adopted.What part did Dr Kelly play in the preparation of the dossier?Dr Kelly wrote most of the section on the history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq and parts of sections on Iraq’s weapons programmes.What knowledge did Dr Kelly have of the contents of the dossier and of earlier drafts of the dossier?He first saw a full copy of the dossier on 19 September at a meeting.

In that case, Lord Hutton might consider in stage two some or all of 15 issues. The Independent provides answers to each in the light of what has been established so far.
How was the dossier of 24 September 2002 prepared and who was responsible for drafting it?The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was supposed to be in charge of the dossier, with the cabinet office assessment staff doing the drafting. James Dingemans QC, counsel for the Hutton inquiry, said yesterday that stage one of the hearings – set up to examine the circumstances leading to the death of David Kelly – had not fully revealed why certain events happened. Sir Joe, and his deputy Tony Cragg, told the inquiry that they had received three letters, but had failed to pass them on to the JIC.. Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, admitted that the most alarming allegation in the document, that Saddam Hussein could launch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes, was misleading because it related to short-range battlefield weapons, and not long-range strategic missiles.Sir Richard, asked if it had been given undue prominence, said: “I think, given the misinterpretation that was placed on the 45-minute intelligence, with the benefit of hindsight you can say that is a valid criticism but I am confident the intelligence was accurate and that the use of it was entirely consistent with the original report.”The former head of the Defence Intelligence Service, Air Marshal Sir Joe French, told the inquiry that he had dismissed formal complaints made by staff about the dossier.